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Regulating Air Toxics
in Rhode Island:
Policy vs. Technical Decisions*
Julie A. Roque"
Introduction
Approximately 2,000 chemicals are emitted into the air routinely;
many are referred to as air toxics. 1 Air toxics are not only wastes, but
also compounds that escape from storage facilities, during transport,
and from production processes. They include volatile materials, such as
gasoline and organic solvents, and metals in gaseous or fine-particulate
forms. Some are associated with cancer, as well as acute health effects
and other chronic effects such as nervous system and organ damage,
teratogenic or reproductive effects.
Until recently, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
delegated the responsibility for managing air toxics to the states. The
R.I. Clean Air Act provides that state's Department of Environmental
Management (DEM) with the authority to promulgate air quality
* This paper is based upon some of Dr. Roqu6's graduate research. During
1986-87, she was responsible for developing the standards for carcinogens discussed
here. She would like to thank Barbara Morin of the Rhode Island DEM and
Professors Harold Ward, Kim Boekelheide, Nelson Fausto, Robert Kates, and Alan
Morrison, her graduate advisors at Brown.
** Dr. Roqu6 received a B.S. and M.S. in chemistry from the University of
California, San Diego, and Brown University, respectively. She also received her
Ph.D. from Brown - in an independently designed interdisciplinary program entitled
"'Environmental Risk Policy."
1 Kean, Dealing With Toxic Air Pollutants: New Initiatives, Issues in Science
and Technology 19-27 (Summer 1986).
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standards and to implement pollution prevention or control programs.
In 1984, DEM proposed the development of an Air Toxics
Regulation to control certain industrial emissions. An advisory
committee met monthly with officials to review the regulation as it was
being written. Notwithstanding the committee's approval, when it went
to public hearing in May 1987, the regulation generated over two years
of controversy.
This paper will examine the regulation and the processes by which it
was derived and resulting controversy was resolved. Ultimately, it will
try to show that, had certain questions been initially identified as ones of




The Air Toxics Regulation defines Acceptable Ambient Levels
(AALs), chemical-specific standards that are used to calculate allowable
rates of emissions from major air pollution sources. The AALs are
health-based standards in that they are intended to limit ambient
concentrations of toxics to levels DEM has deemed "safe"; that is, levels
at which exposures to individuals are believed to be below thresholds
for noncarcinogenic, adverse health effects, or to result only in
"acceptable" additional cancer risks.
Carcinogens
For carcinogens, the regulation has two sets of standards: (1) AALs
governing substances posing an additional risk of one in a million for an
individual developing a particular type of cancer over a lifetime of
exposure (hereinafter 10-6 risks), and (2) "AALs with LAER"
governing risks of one in one hundred thousand (hereinafter 10-5
risks). A permit may be issued for a source if its emissions are not
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expected to increase ground level concentrations by more than
contemplated by the AAL standards. If the concentrations pose higher
risks, DEM can require installation of controls to achieve the "Lowest
Achievable Emission Rate" (LAER).
LAER is defined as the most stringent emission limitation imposed
by any other state or is considered technologically achievable by a
particular industrial category of sources. Permits then may be issued if
emissions from sources that have installed LAER meet the 10-5 AALs.
Basic policy foundations
It was decided initially that toxic emissions in Rhode Island
warranted regulatory action; that DEM would weigh administrative
feasibility by regulating 40 substances (not all carcinogens) from only
the highest priority users; that the AALs would be health-based; and that
DEM would maximize congistency between the AALs and other state
and federal standards.
The last was accomplished by using EPA Guidelines 2 that
recommend criteria for the selection and interpretation of animal data, a
standardized scaling factor based on a surface area basis for conversions
of doses across species, and the use of the linearized multistage model
for high-to-low dose extrapolation. Many of these propositions are
policy based in that they may overlook certain scientific knowledge
available for some toxins, in order to simplify the decision process and
strike a balance between accuracy and consistency in and between risk
assessments. Moreover, they clearly suggest overstating risks and
erring on the side of protecting the public health.
Also, under the regulation, risks at or below the 10-6 level are
considered de minimis and are not regulated. Those between 10-6 and
10-5 are reduced if feasible according to the LAER approach. Sources
that poses more than that level of risk may be required to change their
2 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk
Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992-34,003 (1986).
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processes or shut down. These choices are clearly ones of policy.
Technical foundations
When AALs for carcinogens were first proposed, it appeared that
there were sufficient data available to develop them for 28 compounds.
The data for 3 chemicals, however, were later found inadequate for
assessment, and another, formaldehyde, posed special problems
because of existing high background concentrations.
Fourteen of the remaining twenty-four compounds had been
previously evaluated by the Carcinogenic Assessment Group (CAG) at
EPA, and their unit risk estimates3 were used to calculate AALs by
assuming a linear dose-response relation. Also, DEM used assessments
for perchloroethylene and trichloroethylene generated by the Northeast
States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM), a coalition
of regulators from the New England states plus New York and New
Jersey.
Figure 1 shows the steps in calculating AALs for the remaining eight
compounds. These methods are in accordance with the EPA
Guidelines 4 and had been used by CAG and NESCAUM for the
sixteen substances mentioned above.
Although the Guidelines prescribe methods for dealing with the
major sources of variations in cancer risk assessments, data are scarce
and often are reported in very different forms. Thus, other assumptions
had to be incorporated into calculations of the AALs. Informal
precedents set by EPA in the development of unit risks or standards for
other compounds were relied upon whenever possible. These involved
issues such as the minimum number of dose groups in animal bioassays
and the use of the 95% lower confidence limit (95% LCL) on the dose
3 Unit risks are the risks associated with inhaling air contaminated with 1 gg/m3
of a pollutant over a lifetime.
4 Supra, note 2.
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corresponding to the levels of risk at which the standards were to be set.
Figure 1
Derivations of the AALs
]Identify air toxics for regulation I
Sufficient evidence of carcinogenicity no 9 Regulate as a




Gather animal bioassays and cal-
culate total dose(mg) in animals for




assumed animal body weights
and lifespans (mg/kg/day)
Convert animal doses to human doses
using a surface area adjustment factor
Extrapolate doses (jig/kg/day)
from dose-response data that
correspond to 10-5 and 106risks
Was an "acceptable" fit of then
dose-response model obtained?
4 1
Drop high dose if there
are no other effects
Calculate the 95% lower confidence
limits all 10-5 and 10"6doses
V
Calculate ambient concentrations (jtg/m3)
that correspond to 95%LCLs on doses
V
Select lowest ambient level for the AAL
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Opposition
At the public hearing in 1987, the Rhode Island Chamber of
Commerce Federation voiced strong opposition, despite having had a
technical representative on the advisory committee. It also lodged an
unsuccessful attempt to block the regulation, charging that the AALs
were "arbitrary and capricious." 5
After the regulation was promulgated in 1988, the Chamber
threatened further legal action. It argued that the methods were overly
risk averse, claimed that alternative assumptions in the risk assessments
would provide less stringent standards and urged that the AALs should
be relaxed.6
For example, they criticized the use of a linearized multistage model
to extrapolate from high to low doses.7 They also objected to basing
risk estimates only on the most sensitive species and the most
pronounced effect reported; converting animal exposures to human
5 Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce Federation, Petition to R.I. Superior Court
for Temporary Restraining Order Against the R.I. Department of Environmental
Management, Division of Air and Hazardous Materials, Regulation 22, Air Toxics
(Mar. 1988) (copy of petition available from the Rhode Island Department of
Environmental Management, Legal Services, 83 Park Street, Providence, RI 02903).
6 For similar views see, e.g., Nichols & Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence:
How Conservative Risk Assessments Distort Regulation, 10 Regulation 13-24
(Nov./Dec. 1986); Paustenbach, Health Risk Assessments: Opportunities and
Pitfalls, 14 COLUMBIA J. ENVT'L L. 379-410 (1989); Anderson, Scientific
Developments in Risk Assessment: Legal Implications, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
411-25 (1989).
7 This point is well documented for a number of animal carcinogens where the
use of different dose-response relations can alter unit risk values by orders of
magnitude. See, for example: Schneiderman, Regulation of Carcinogens in an
Imprecise World, 363 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACADEMY OF SciENCES 217-32 (1981);
Van Ryzin, Quantitative Risk Assessment, 22 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 321-26
(1980); Crump, Methods for Carcino genic Risk Assessment, ch. 7 in PRINCIPLES
CF HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 279-319 (1985); Brown, Learning About Toxicity in
Humans from Studies on Animals, 13 CHEMTECH 350-58 (1983) and ENVIRON,
Elements of Toxicology and Chemical Risk Assessment 40 (1986).
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doses using factors based on surface area; and using lower 95%
confidence limits on doses to calculate the AALs.
Resolution
At the directive of the governor, DEM officials, beginning in 1988,
met with Chamber representatives to review the methods by which the
AALs were derived. The Chamber finally dropped its threat of legal
action in July 1989 after a rigorous, two day meeting attended by it and
representatives of statewide health and environmental organizations. The
purpose of the meeting was to review the technical details of the AAL
calculations and allow a toxicologist hired by the Chamber to question
DEM about their methods.
The toxicologist presented only general arguments against the
methods used to derive the AALs: why it may not be appropriate to use
animal data for calculating human risks; why people may not be as
sensitive as the most sensitive animal species; that the linearized
multistage model and the 95% LCL can overestimate risks by orders of
magnitude; and that, for some compounds, there is evidence to believe
that body weight is a more appropriate measure of interspecies
variability. Later, the toxicologist questioned how default values for
animal and human body weights and other variables were obtained.
However, the toxicologist agreed that there are no conclusive answers to
such questions.
Ultimately, a number of "points of agreement" were reached
concerning the process by which future regulations would be
developed. These included that DEM would: provide more complete
documentation; consider outside peer review of future AALs; consider
forming a science panel to advise regulators; and incorporate new
scientific information into the derivations of the AALs as the agency
finds it appropriate.
However, as mentioned earlier, DEM had made a series of policy
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decisions prior to the development of the AALs. Those did not appear to
cause significant controversy, although they were perhaps even more
influential than issues in dispute. They had been designated as policy
choices from the beginning and appeared to leave little room for purely
technical criticism. Disputes on scientific issues did not end up being
resolved on technical grounds. Had more critical choices been earlier
recognized as turning on policy, much debate might have been avoided.
Sensitivity Analyses of Decision Rules
Undertaking a task such as deriving AALs requires choosing among
competing decision rules. Some of the rules used by DEM are are set
forth below in Table 1 - along with plausible alternatives.
To focus debate on key issues, it is useful to attempt to determine
which decision rules play the largest role in the final regulatory
determinations. To do this, rules can first be put into two categories:
those for which the variations in final risk estimates depend upon
particular sets of data and those for which variations are directly
proportional to constant ratios.
The data-specific decision rules are: the choice of effect; calculation
of AALs based on a single effect; averaging animal doses over their
lifetimes; the choice of the dose-response relation; the goodness-of-fit
criterion; and the use of the -lower confidence limit on dose. The
variation in risk estimates attributed to these rules cannot be evaluated
without case-by-case calculations and therefore multiple extrapolations
were performed for every data set (or combinations of data sets) for
each toxic.
The second type of decision rules are: the choice of the interspecies
conversion factor, default values for consumption rates, body weights
and lifespans in animals; and default values for inhalation rates and body
weights in humans. These terms may enter the risk calculations at more
than one point, but they are constant and simple proportions can be
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formulated.
Table I
Decision Rules to Derive AALs
Decision Choice for AALs Alternatives
- Choice of effect in
animals upon which
to base risk estimate
- Calculate the risk
of cancer at one site




. Default rates for
animal consumption
& body weights






. Lower confidence limit
vs. maximum likelihood
estimate of dose







































Decision rules that introduce the greatest variation into the AALs can
be identified by sensitivity analyses. Such analyses indicate how the
AALs would have varied had different decision rules been employed
and are easily undertaken - many could be performed on the back of an
2 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 123 [Spring 1991]
envelope. Sensitivity analyses for the rules in Table 1 are summarized in
Table 2.
Table 2
Results of Sensitivity Analyses for Decision Rules
Factor Changes
* Choice of effect
" Single vs. pooled effects
" Lifetime average exposures
" Animal consumption rates
" Animal body weights
" Animal lifespans
* Interspecies conversion factor
(surface area vs. body weight)
" Dose-response relation
" "Goodness-of-fit"
" 95% LCL vs. MLE of dose
" Human body weight
* Human inhalation rate
1.0 - 50; median = 4.0
0.4- 1.0*
0.9 - 2.0 (mice)
1.0 - 2.0 (rats)
0.9 - 2.0 (overall)
0.9 - 1.1 (male rats)
0.7- 1.0 (female rats)
0.8 - 1.5 (mice)
0.7 - 1.5 (overall)
0.3 - 1.0 (rats)
0.4 - 1.0 (mice)
0.3 - 1.0 (overall)
1-6 (rats)







* The AAL would have differed for just one compound.
** The use of studies based on short-term exposures and averaging exposures over a
lifetime could alter risk estimates by factors of .01 - 100. Short-term experiments
were not, however, used to derive the AALs.
Human inhalation rates may be, in part, dependent upon body weight.
Each range represents the ratios of ambient concentrations that
would have been calculated by varying assumptions for each decision
Decision Rule
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rule, to the AALs that were adopted in the Air Toxics Regulation. A
factor change of 0.5, for example, indicates that an AAL that would
have been calculated using an alternative decision rule would have been
0.5 x the current value, or twice as stringent. Conversely, a factor
change of 2 means the AAL would be twice as high, or half as stringent.
Individually, most decisions are trivial in comparison to the choice
of the dose-response relation. Multiplying the extremes of these ranges
could provide a "super worst case" measure of the degree by which risk
estimates might be over- or understated.8 Even combined, all of the
other decisions do not outweigh the influence of the dose-response
model.
The risk tolerance of decision rides
Figure 2, below, sorts decision rules into four categories: risk
averse, risk prone, best guess, and "???." Those in the risk averse box
are likely to have provided AALs that are more stringent than necessary
to achieve the desired risk levels; ones in the risk prone box led to less
stringent AALs; and "best guess" decisions are those that are unlikely to
over- or understate the "true" risk.
The dose-response relation is placed in a fourth box because there is
no evidence supporting the choice of one dose-response model over
another for any substance evaluated. Further, the sensitivity calculations
indicate that the linearized multistage model may have overestimated the
AALs for some compounds, but underestimated them for others.
Lacking better chemical-specific information, dose-response decisions
cannot categorized as risk averse, risk prone, or best guess.
8 Multiplying these factors assumes the "correct" values are the extremes for each.
Clearly, the likelihood of such a case is small, if not negligible, and this
simplification provides an overestimate. See Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really
-Too Conservative?: Revising the Revisionists, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL L.447 (1989).
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Figure 2
Risk Aversity of Risk Assessment Assumptions
"Risk Averse" "Risk Prone "
Choice of effect "Goodness-of fit"
Interspecies conversion Single effect
Human inhalation rate
95% LCL vs. NILE
"Best Guess" ???





Some risk adverse rules were stated explicitly when the Air Toxics
Regulation was written, e.g., that humans are at least as sensitive as the
most sensitive animal species (choice of effect) that the 95% LCL would
be used. (The 95% LCL may be considered risk averse 'on the
average.' Although it is not risk averse for a single potency assessment,
as a lower bound, it is likely to overstate estimates for groups of
potencies on the whole.) These could have somewhat significant
impacts on the AALs.
However, other rules, whenever adopted, had little influence.
Pooling effects; different animal consumption rates, weights or
lifespans; human weights; and dropping the goodness-of-fit criterion
would have changed the final standards by factors of two or less. And
in many cases, these changes would have been lost when the AALs
were rounded off to single digits.
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The factor changes for high-to-low dose extrapolation demonstrated
that the linearized multistage relation is not usually the most risk averse
model and, in fact, is risk prone for certain sets of data. Further, the use
of other dose-response relations could have decreased some of the
AALs (making them more stringent) by factors greater than those by
which other AALs would have increased. The sensitivity analyses did
not consider the special susceptibility of children to certain toxics which,
if taken into account, might indicate that several of these rules are even
less risk averse or more risk prone.9
Risk Debates
Policy and uncertainty
The choice of different dose-response relations can provide widely
varying risk estimates and may change regulatory decisions. In many
instances, however, available scientific information is so limited that one
cannot approximate the uncertainty associated with an estimate, or even
predict whether certain models will over- or understate risks; this was
especially true for the air toxics evaluated by DEM.
As noted above, altering most of the other decision rules would not
alter the regulatory decisions. Yet, risk controversies often involve
lengthy debates about the assumptions that are the most accurate even
for those rules.
Some questions could, in theory, be "answered" with sufficient
scientific information. The choice of dose-response models is one of
those. Table 3 lists other issues facing DEM in regulating carcinogens
under the Air Toxics program.
9 See D. KAmE, ENviRONMEAL HAARDsTO YOUNG CHazREN (1985).
2 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 123 [Spring 1991)
Table 3
Sources of Variation in Risk Estimates
Decision Rule Source of variation
" Drop formaldehyde for practical purposes policy
* Maximize consistency between AALs and policy
between RI & other states & federal
standards by using standardized rules
" Method of regulation policy
" Develop health-based (vs technology) standards
" Adopt AALs for both 10-6 & 10-5 risks
(weigh technical feasibility of controls)
• Regulate 40 toxics from highest priority users
(weigh administrative ability)
" Assess & regulate single effects policy
* Characterization of animal risk uncertainty
" Use animal data (assumed relevant)
* Average dose over lifetimes
" Default consumption rates, body weights
& lifespans
" Extrapolation from animal to human uncertainty
" Use most pronounced effect.
" Surface area interspecies conversion
* Linearized multistage model
" "Goodness-of-fit" criterion
" 95% lower confidence limit on dose
" Default body weight & inhalation rate for policy
characterization of human risk
(portion of the population protected)
Each rule or set of rules is categorized grossly as "policy" or
"uncertainty" as indicators of the sources of variation in risk estimates.
Rules categorized as "uncertainty" would be redefined or avoided
altogether if we had "perfect" information. Thus, rules with sources of
variation designated as "uncertainty" are designed to deal with gaps in
scientific knowledge. Of course, in the absense of "perfect" scientific
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information, the treatment of uncertainty is itself a policy decision
one closely tied to choosing an appropriate level of risk aversion.
"Perfect" scientific information would enable regulators to resolve
some controversies, but policy decisions still would remain. In fact,
some would become more difficult once we could predict reliably who
might be most affected by risk sources. E.g, should the "average" or the
most sensitive individual be protected, or how should individual risks
be weighed against benefits to society as a whole?
Academic vs. policy science
The distinctions between basic or "academic" science and applied or
"policy" science may also exacerbate the tendency to dwell on technical
issues. The differences between the two have been explored by authors
who agree that both have valid, if different, goals. 10
The primary goal of academic science is knowledge; this includes
developing, usually relatively free of urgent need, further understanding
of natural and biological processes that, at least in the near term, may or
may not prove socially useful. The goals of policy-driven science are
usually to solve pressing problems. Rather than not act at all in the face
of potential for large adverse consequences, agencies often use data that
would be insufficient by the standards of academic science.
How risk measures are defined also may differ between these two
types of science. In academic science, measures often are used to best
describe a set of observations; i.e., to. be internally valid. Policy
research, on the other hand, demands that knowledge be generalized to
very different situations than those in which the data may have been
collected.
10 See, for example Ravetz, Usable Knowledge, Usable Ignorance: Incomplete
Science with Policy Implications, ch. 15 in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
BiosPHiRE 415-32 (WILLIAM C. CLARK & R.E. MUNN ed. 1986); and Ravetz,
Uncertainty, Ignorance and Policy, ch. 7 in SCIENCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 77-93
(HARVEY BROOKS& CHEsTER L. COOPER ed. 1987).
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The objectives of risk assessments can determine how scientific
information is interpreted and used.1 1 Also, in the face of limited
resources, regulators often rely on very questionable assumptions to
shift the burden of proof onto risk generators. Whether one agrees or
not, their choice to do so is clearly not a technical issue.
Conclusion
Rather than argue over explicit policy choices, critics dive into
endless technical debates about what are the most "scientifically correct"
methods to assess risks. As one author points out: "... in our
profoundly numerical contemporary culture, numbers are symbols of
precision, accuracy, and objectivity." 12 Even when the variation in risk
estimates is characterized, numbers suggest higher levels of accuracy
than they really represent.
Regulators are particularly vulnerable to technical attacks because,
e.g. allowable rates of discharges are usually set with precision. Yet,
investments in new controls are, for the most part, all or nothing, and
industries that are just over allowable limits can be required to install
pollution controls that may be very expensive for the level of reduction
achieved. 13
Thus, industry may have an incentive to delay. One way to
accomplish delay is to argue over endless details. 14 Also, technical
arguments are often encouraged and sometimes even required by
regulatory and legal institutions for political reasons. The manipulation
of technical information to such ends has been explored by others. One
11 Russell & Gruber, Risk Assessment in Environmental Policy-Making, 236
SCIENcE 286-290 (1987).
12 D. STONE, PoLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 136 (1988).
13 As a matter of regulatory discretion, however, companies are usually allowed
considerable leeway.
14 Moreover, in the case of proposed new facilities, people who oppose them may
also have an incentive to delay.
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concludes that "Having the balance of scientific evidence on one's side
provides strong support and legitimacy for a position." 15 Another
observes that "By invoking the authoritative canons of scientific
reasoning and method, public authorities and others who have a stake in
technical issues seek to demonstrate the rationality of their position and
thereby gain political support and acceptance."' 16 The result is that
quantitative analyses may be granted undeserved prominence in public
policy debates, and basic factors driving controversies may be blurred
or buried by technical arguments.
Risk management controversies should not be contests over who
can produce the most "experts" with the strongest credentials - ones
where non-technical interests are often excluded. Regulators can
accomplish that end and limit pointless debate by 1) characterizing the
variation in risk estimates; 2) providing full presentations of risk
calculations, methods and assumptions; and 3) stating policy choices
upon which risk assessments are based. Technical criticism appears to
dissipate quickly when policy decisions about even legitimate scientific
questions are made explicit. The object should not be to eliminate
controversy but to force everyone to grapple with tough policy choices
that may be concealed in a mass of often irrelevant technical details.
15 Rushefsky, The Misuse of Science in Governmental Decisionmaking, 9
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN VALUES 54 (1984).
16 Ronald Brickman, as quoted in Rushefsky, The Misuse of Science in
Governmental Decisionmaking, 9 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & HUMAN VALUES 54
(1984).
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